of voters on the ideological landscape. The authors highlight that the latter should be of particular interest to campaign strategists.

The overarching finding of *The American Political Landscape* is the increasing importance of cultural values to the presidential vote across these decades among both the national electorate and almost all of the various social groups that comprise this electorate. Economics remain important, but are now matched by culture. Furthermore, both Republican voters and Democratic voters have become ideologically consistent, in conservative and liberal directions, respectively, on the two values dimensions. Shafer and Spady also find that, as a social group, Hispanics are economically liberal, but culturally conservative—with each political party thus having something that attracts, as well as repels, this increasingly important segment. Interpreting voting probability contour plots overlaid on voter density maps, the authors also provide novel evidence for why the ideological middle may be frequently bereft of candidates; not many plausible supporters of partisan candidates actually reside in the middle.

The major strength of *The American Political Landscape* is its unprecedented, self-described *thick description*. However, many of its core substantive findings have been previously documented. Inexplicably never mentioned, the still-vibrant debate on the question of a culture war (for example, Morris Fiorina, *Culture War*) has already highlighted the increasing importance of a cultural dimension across the past two decades of presidential voting, as well as the partisan sort that has produced the more-ideologically consistent parties in the electorate. Also uncited, numerous examinations in political science provide precursors to this treatment’s social group considerations (for example, the analyses of Axelrod and Stanley and Niemi, among others). Finally, although documentation of temporal shifts in the electorate—for example, the especially marked cultural shift to the right among Republican voters—is informative, a theoretically motivated assessment of the processes that (may) produce these shifts would be welcome. Do elites lead the way or respond to the masses? What is the role of conflict extension, and so forth? *The American Political Landscape* does not tackle these questions.

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“History,” Winston Churchill is reported to have observed, “is written by the victors.” The losers, if they are lucky enough to avoid vilification, are airbrushed out.
When it comes to our understanding of American foreign policies of the first four decades of the twentieth century, the history-writing victors have, for the most part, been liberal internationalists. Democrats and Republicans alike, in the wake of the Second World War, concluded that the task of making the world safe for America demanded active, global U.S. politico-military engagement. In the name of liberal international institutions, Washington’s “Farewell” injunctions against entangling alliances would be consigned to the waste bin of quaint anachronisms.

A policy shift of this magnitude necessarily required a reinterpretation of history—in this case, a rehabilitation of Woodrow Wilson and particularly Wilson’s rejected brainchild, the League of Nations. In the account of American foreign policy learned and taught by the Greatest Generation, a central tenet has been that America’s refusal to endorse Wilson’s league was a cardinal failure and critical factor in the road leading to World War II. While Wilson himself comes in for a share of the blame for his pathological rigidity and political ineptness, the great villains in the victor’s history are the opponents of the league. They—like the opponents of America’s entry into World War I—are dismissed as naïve, hidebound, parochial, short-sighted, or foolish.

But, of course, they were not. In this meticulously researched and wonderfully well-written intellectual biography of the preeminent opponent of the war and of the peace, Wisconsin Senator Robert La Follette, Richard Drake permits us to view the period through very different conceptual lenses. Drake carefully documents La Follette’s Progressive anti-imperialist thinking—with all its flaws and inconsistencies, as well as its extraordinary fundamental insights and flashes of brilliance—while tracing the intellectual path that took “Fighting Bob” from his roots as a McKinley Republican to his position as a holdout against America’s entry into World War I, an “Irreconcilable” opponent of the League of Nations, and an irreconcilable opponent of the liberal, internationalist policies of his own Republican colleagues.

Though damned as one by his political opponents, La Follette was no socialist. La Follette saw himself in the tradition of Abraham Lincoln. Perhaps more accurately, however, he can be understood as part of an older tradition, one that marks him an heir of Thomas Jefferson. For La Follette, the single issue around which everything else revolved was the fundamental danger to American republican democracy posed by the increasing power of the wealthy and by the foreign entanglements generated by their cupidity.

Whether or not one agrees with La Follette’s analysis, his understanding of the dangers posed to republican institutions and society by unconstrained national and transnational capital is laden with implications. Seeing the world through La Follette’s eyes, it is impossible to avoid the conclusion...
that the league was, in Drake’s words, “the enforcement arm of an international crime syndicate. American membership in it would be the final disgrace for the American Republic and its obituary” (p. 288). Thus, far from the guarantor of a just peace, the league was, like the Holy Alliance a century earlier, a coordinating body of repressive, rapacious, imperial powers, set in opposition to the free will of the world’s peoples.

Taking time to study La Follette—and taking time, too, to re-examine the competing vision and foreign policy program of the liberal Republican “isolationists” of the 1920s—serves two purposes. Obviously, it permits a more-realistic understanding of America’s troubled path toward hegemony on the world stage. More importantly, though, La Follette and other opponents of the league—“Revisionist” as well as “Irreconcilable”—offer intriguing alternatives for dealing with today’s global challenges. As useful as Drake’s book is for historians, it might most profitably be read by America’s political thinkers, political leaders, and policymakers.

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If you ask any lay person—or most scholars of comparative politics—about the motivation for party formation in Africa, they are likely to offer the same answer: ethnicity. In a welcome antidote to this orthodoxy, Sebastian Elischer argues that African political parties and party systems are much more diverse than that. He relies upon seminal analysis by Larry Diamond and Richard Gunther to propose a typology of five ideal varieties: the mono-ethnic party, the multi-ethnic alliance, the catch-all party, the programmatic party, and the personalistic party. While the first two types arise from ethnic foundations, the last three are distinctly non-ethnic. If nothing else, this book will discourage future analysts from lazily conflating all forms of party organization in Africa under an ethnic label.

Elischer’s detailed empirical analysis covers all effective parties across all election periods in three African countries between 1990 and 2009. He discovers that non-ethnic parties prevail in Ghana, as does a mixed-party system in Namibia; in Kenya, by contrast, he finds that ethnic parties persist. Across 28 observations of election periods, 16 parties are ethnic and 11 are non-ethnic (though non-ethnic parties enjoy greater electoral success), a situation confirmed when analysis is extended (in less depth) to 7 additional countries and